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Article 2

*AN ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF JURISTIC
PERSONALITY
I.
The problem of the juristic (or the juridical or moral) personality undoubtedly belongs among the most difficult problems of legal science. It appears in every branch of that
science (e. g., in civil law, and especially in commercial law,
in criminal, administrative, constitutional and international
law); it was discussed by the Romau jurists and is still a
matter of discussion in our times. Thus it is considered a
problem of primary importance; but a problem it is indeed,
since no general agreement regarding the nature of this "personality" has been reached so far.
The numerous theories concerning the notion of the juristic person can, perhaps, for the purpose of a general discussion, be reduced to three main ideas:
I. Doctrine: The juristic person is a real entity;
II. Doctrine: The juristic person is a juridical entity;
III. Doctrine: The juristic person is not an entity at
all, either real or juridical; it is a mere abbreviation
of thoughts and words, a help to quick communication just as are many other terms.
I. The first doctrine is known also as the organic theory
and was chiefly advocated by certain German authors. It
maintains that even before and without legal regulations
there exist real entities formed by a collectivity of men, such
entities being like the individual naturally endowed with the
quality of volition and action. Besides the natural organism
(with its body and soul) there are social organisms having
their own life and even a soul of their own. Some even speak
of their "body." It appears that this somewhat naturalistic
and materialistic doctrine has helped to introduce the generally' acknowledged term "corporation" (from the Latin
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"corpus"--body) and the widespread usage of the. English
word "body" meaning all kinds of human associations.
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to scrutinize this doctrine scientifically. It seems to be a question of belief. Whoever believes in the existence of real "soul" of a nation or
of the will of a corporation (e. g., the state) in the same way
as he believes in the will-power of a human being, and who
is not aware of the metaphorical usage of these words when
applied to associations-he certainly will not find any difficulty in ascribing reality to a juristic person in the sense of
the reality of "man" being a psycho-physical entity. But
whoever holds (as we do) that a corporation, a municipalityor a state is only a juridical unit which, it is true, has been
created through identical aims, out of which however one
sole aim, one so-called collective will, one soul can never
evolve,--he can not adhere to the belief of the organic school.
II. The second doctrine may be called the fiction-theory;
it is also known as the Romanistic doctrine. It holds that, by
principle, only human beings can have legal qualifications;
but it adds that, exceptionally, such qualifications can be
extended to artificial, fictitious subjects; such subjects are
the "juridical persons," namely persons created for juridical
purposes. Thus, this theory holds that "juridical" or "juristic" persons, though being fictions and not natural entities,
have a legal or juridical reality.
I. The third group of theories endeavors to demonstrate that "juristic persons" are neither natural nor jurid*ical entities, for- they have no real rights or duties, rights
and duties being applicable only to human individuals and
not to fictitious beings (even if the latter be construed for
juridical purposes only). This doctrine has been worked
out in modem times by the "normative school" and chiefly
by its champion, Professor Kelsen. But it must be noted
that, even in earlier times, great masters of juridical science
looked with scepticism upon the reality of juristic persons.
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Thus Ihering,1 the great German jurist, said that the rights
of the so-called juristic persons belong to real human beings
only; that is in the case of a corporation, to all its members,
and in the case of endowments to those persons for whom
the fruition of the endowment is intended. Another noted
German author, Brinz,2 held that rights which do not belong to a human person belong to nobody, and that they
are merely attached to a certain purpose. Stamniler' speaks
of the legal capacity of an association as being merely a
"method."
Two knowii French writers, Geny 4 and Duguit,5 speak,
the first with great scepticism, the second with open censure, about the usefulness of the notion "juristic person."
And the greatest English legal philosopher of the nineteenth
century, John Austin, says in his famous "Lectures on Jurisprudence":' "At present I will merely remark that they are
persons by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in discourse*. All rights reside in, and all duties are incumbent
upon, physical or natural persons. But by ascribing them
to feigned persons, and not to the physical persons whom
they in truth concern, we are frequently able to abridge our
descriptions of them."

Let us now consider and analyze some kinds of juristic
persons. Generally speaking, theory recognizes two main
kinds of such persons both of which comprise a group of
human beings and also a group of things (e. g., funds in
trust or .objects endowed for public use): (1) Corporations;
and (2) Institutions or foundations. This distinction . is
based upon the fact that, in the case of the corporation the
individuals of the group in whose interest the common ad1
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ministration is set up, participate in this administration
either directly, i. e., personally, or indircetly, i. e., by means
of chosen representatives (e. g., in the case of a limited company); whereas in the case of an institution or foundation
the individuals (beneficiaries) do not participate in the administration either directly or indirectly.
In order to illustrate the first species we shall now consider
certain .commercial or gainful associations or companies,
some of which are and some of which are not, at least according to European legal doctrines, classified as corporations and thus as juristic persons. Why this different classification? Without entering into a detailed analysis of the various types of companies, we may, in anticipating the result
of our inquiries, say this: Each type is characterized by a
set of rules indicating the method of defining the rights and
duties of the individual members. These rules are more or
less complicated, but finally they lead always to the members or to the organs of the association and thus to human
beings as the real bearers of rights and duties. Thus we have
the saying "the company itself has rights and duties." This
saying is employed when the way in which the rights of the
individual have to be determined is long and complicated.
It is simply an abbreviating formula to obviate the analysis
of numerous and perhaps very complicated juridical relations amongst the people in the association, and between
them and outsiders. For, it is often not important for the
outsiders to know who, within the group associated, will perform a certain action, for instance pay a certain sum and
how the debt will be finally distributed amongst the members who are, anyhow, the real payers as far as their liability
goes. The creditors are only interested in getting the sum
due in a legally valid way. And, vice versa, it is of no interest
to the debtors of the company how the sum they paid will
be finally distributed amongst the members of the company
who are the real creditors. The sum is simply paid, as we
say, to the "company" and it is left with the organization
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of the company how to have the sum given to the real creditors, i. e., the individual members, according to the rules of
the company. It does not alter matters at all even if the sum
paid happens in the way just mentioned to be reduced or
even cancelled on account of debts of the company; for the
result of all these operations appears .in the "dividend" or
in the lack of it. But we must realize, in addition, that when
we speak of any act whatsoever as being performed by the
company, we are using a mere metaphor since all such acts
are executed by definite persons who are appointed, empowered and endowed with rights and duties according to the
law or the by-law (statute) of the organization and who
are called organs. Thus we can always penetrate through
all the juridical net-work to real human beings as bearers of
rights and duties.
Now when this net-work of rules, as we call the legal organization of the group, is simple--such as is the case with
the "societas" of Roman Law-then the rights and duties of
the members can be easily perceived, and accordingly they
themselves are usually, considered the bearers of rights and
duties and not the group; and so the group is not considered
a "juristic person." But when the net-work of rules ruling a
company is so complicated and dense that the rights and
duties of its members can be discovered only after a protracted analysis, then we are accustomed to speak of this group
as a special juristic person. Thus the organization, i. e., the
network of rules, is personified; and now we can better understand Austin's remark that these "persons" are feigned
"for the sake of brevity in discourse" and that, thus, we are
"able to abridge our descriptions of them."
We can observe, however, that the capacity and also the
will, to penetrate through the net of the juridical mechanism
right to the real subjects, is not the same with all people. A
simple mechanism which he cannot or does not wish to
analyze is often a sufficient reason for an average man to
resort to personification; he does not distinguish between the
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"societas" and the "corporatio" of Roman Law; he speaks of
a "bank," of a "hospital," of a "railway," of a "factory" as
subjects of rights and duties, and does not bother whether
these entities are a corporation or a society or a foundation
or an institution. It is only the trained jurist who penetrates
to the real subjects-men; the better he is trained the easier
he will make this operation. But sometimes perhaps, though
capable to do so, he has not the desire to analyze; e. g., when
he is not interested in who within the group will be finally
charged with a duty or entitled to a right. The real legal
subjects will in that case remain undefined for him, because
he does not want to define them. The legislator also may
sometimes take such a view in saying simply that an association has rights and duties, that it can sue or be sued,-leaving the business of defining the final subjects of rights
and duties to the by-laws or statutes, which-and this must
not be overlooked-are also part of objective law. But such
a merely subjective attitude (subjective also in the case of
the legal scientist and of the legislator) is not a basis solid
enough for the construction of a notion which is supposed
to have objective value:It seems that the muddled condition
of the theory of the juristic personality is a consequence of
subjective views.
III.
Yet there is a species of societies regulated by commercial
codes to which juristic personality is acknowledged now almost unanimously. This is the "limited company"; its members participate in the enterprise by means of shares up to
the amount of which they are liable for the debts of the
enterprise. As a rule, these shares are freely transferable;
consequently the real proprietors (owners) of the enterprise
are very often unknown to the public and are unidentified.
One does not know the shareholders and how many shares
are held by each person. Therefore the French call such an
association a "socit6 anonyme." It seems that, once the
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shares have been paid, a new and independent proprietorship has come to existence which is administered by special
organs and represented by them. Only rarely does it become
apparent who the real proprietors are. Yet, this becomes
evident precisely at two important moments: on tlke occasion
of a general assembly of the members, i. e., the shareholders,
and on the occasion of the distribution of the dividend. At
these rare moments the anonymity is interrupted and the
real proprietors appear.. They are definitely discernible by
the possession and presentation of shares.
This example leads us to consider another kind of juridical
relations under which the, owner of propriety is in fact purposely and permanently undefined, because fruition or gain
only is allowed to certain persons, whereas ownership is not
intended to belong to anybody. The temporary anonymity,
as characteristic of the limited company, turns in the case
now under consideration into a permanent legal anonymity.
Such is the case with the other and second big group of
"juristic persons," called foundations and institutions.They
are certain things (money or other goods) designated by a
certain act (e. g., donation or testament) for a certain purpose. Starting with the thesis that all property must be
owned by a person the jurists endeavored to find that person. But they could not find any such human person. The
property in question cannot be owned by the founder because it was just his will to part with this property. It is not
owned by the beneficiaries for whom the fruition is intended;
for such beneficiaries. perhaps did not exist at the moment
the foundation was established, and, they can:,-in any case,
enjoy only the revenue of the property but they cannot dispose of the property itself. Nor are the administrators of the
property its owners, for they have to administer the property for the purpose indicated by the founder and not for
themselves. Therefore the jurists invented a fictitious "juristic" person who should own the property. For this purpose
they personified either the property itself, or the "will" of
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the founder, or even the organization, i. e., the rules of the
foundation. But the property cannot be owned by itself, the
imagination of the "will" of the founder (who perhaps is
already dead) as proprietor is rather a grotesque idea, but
not less phantastic than the personification of the organization, i. e., of a set of rules, as owner; it is by these very rules
that a definite method of administration was set up which
excludes any ownership, i. e., power of free disposal.
We can avoid all these queer modes of construction if we
part with the idea that every thing must be owned by a
person. We can imagine without any difficulty things which
are not bwned by anybody but which are simply administered
in a set way. This applies to the aforementioned cases.
We may also, it is true, imagine ownership itself merely as
a kind of administration, but the very important fact is
that the method of administration is not fixed in the case
of ownership. This is the distinguishing characteristic of
ownership that the owner can do with his property as he
pleases; he can even destroy it. Though ownership has in
modern times been limited in many cases, it still serves in
most cases exclusively those interests which are determined
by the owner himself; therefore he is held the subject of
ownership. This property right is the prototype of any subjective right, the latter being defined as power or domination.
The more this absolute right becomes limited, the more the
owner turns into a mere administrator of the property for
he can no longer deal with it as he wills, but only according
to set rules which do not always serve his interests. And this
right turns entirely into mere administration when the possessor is not allowed to use a thing he possesses for himself
and as he likes, but when he is only entitled to administer
it for others and as they determine. There are many intermediary situations between the absolute domination (dominium) which is essentially a pagan conception and the Christian idea which declines such domination and which has thoroughly subdued it in the magnificent idea of complete pover-
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ty in the monastic life. It is important for the understanding
of the law and its interpretation that two worlds of ideas
are clashing in this contrast: one world (the Pagan) is
based mainly upon the idea of domination, absolute ownership, subjective right; the other .(the Christian) starting
with the view that we are not in this world to dominate for
ourselves, but to serve others even with the power vested
in us, and always to serve God,--is unable thoroughly to accept ownership in the Roman sense; for it does not acknowledge subjective rights without subjective duties, and domination without service. As however the Christian ideal of complete detachment from Worldly goods can be reached only
by a few chosen souls, a certain egotistic sphere of absolute
domination over things has been and probably will always
be reserved, and with it the notion of complete private property and of subjective rights. But besides this egotistic inclination there exists the other, an altruistic one which,
though not unknown in pre-Christian times, has, particularly
under the influence of Christian ideas, brought forth precious
fruit of charity and devotion. In this sphere in which there
is no place for absolute domination and for property rights,
institutions and foundations have found a fertile ground for
growth and development:
Now, we are accustomed .to speak of the property of the
church, the state or the community, or of a foundation or
institutior. Though it does not serve the interests of definite
persons who could dispose of it arbitrarily (which is an essential feature of property rights) we speak nevertheless of
it as property, probably for the reason also that it is protected by the same legal means as the property of definite
persons is protected. This protection is granted in order that
nobody outside the institution in question may appropriate
things labeled as its "property." But, in addition to this, it
is protected by other legal means also which prohibit the persons within the institution, i. e., its organs and also the bene-
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ficiaries, from appropriating it to themselves.,' Thus, by all
these means, the special purpose of the institution is protected; and this purpose is plainly indicated by the existence of a
special administration which differs from the free exercise
of property rights. The theory, it is true, has invented a new.
term "public property" for application in some such cases.
But this term cannot be applied to institutions whose use is
not determined for the public at large but only for a set of
qualified persons as is the case with many foundations. And
even when public use is intended, that means only usage,
fruition and not property. The old Romans, with their beautiful logic, did not acknowledge any property rights concerning things which were "usui publico destinatae"; on the
contrary; they declared those things to be "extra comrercium" and they excluded by a formal act called "publicatio"
any property rights to such things.
It is interesting to study how the notion of property was
employed to explain the legal situations of institutions and
foundations. In a statement made by a Dutchman, Schook,8
in the middle of the seventeenth century, regarding church
property, it was said that the "dominium proprietatis" of it
belongs to nobody, the "dominium absolutissimum" to God,
the "dominium directivum" to the state, and the "dominium
possessionis" or "servitutis" to the clergy. We can easily see
that by this terminology he was explaining different spheres
of the administration 6f one and the same thing. For if we
leave aside the "dominium absolutissimum" of God (for God
cannot be a subject in a juridical sense, since he cannot be.
subject to any system of rules) we find that the "dominium
proprietatis"belongs to nobody at all, the "dominium directivum" of the state means the right of its supervision and the
"dominium possessionis" of the clergy means administration and fruition by the clergy. Others ascribed the ownerConf. PIrAIC, A T"VATISE ON THE STATE (1933) 40, 41.
Quoted in the brilliant treatise of Bernatzik, "Kritische Studien ueber den
Begriff der juristischen Person." Archiv fuer oeffentliches Recht, voL V., p. 294
7

8

(1890).
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ship of church goods to the Pope or to the holder of the
"beneficium," or to the collegium of the clergy, or to the
parish or to the religious communion. This latter theory
served in the time of the Reformation to justify the maintenance of property rights of the parish though its members
had changed their belief. And the theory of the "dominium
eminens" of state fostered the secularization of church goods.
This is an example of the danger connected with construing
property rights in cases where such rights are not compatible
with the purpose of the institution.
The result of our reflection about the so-called juristic
person is: The real bearers of rights and duties in the case
of gainful societies (especially commercial companies) are
its members; they can always be. determined. This statement is clear and quite natural; for the association is established exclusively for the material benefit of its individual
members. It is otherwise in the case of foundations and institutions. Here the administration is carried on for the benefit of an undetermined number of persons, many of them being unknown and unknowable because not yet existent;
moreover all these persons are only benefiqiaries of the fruition or of the usage of the institution, whereas there is no
holder of the property itself who could have the right of free
disposal; therefore no real property rights exist. Of course
there are many intermediary and therefore mixed forms of
the two types of "juristic persons."
So we come to the conclusion that in the essence of the
law there are no ficticious persons; and thus the "juristic"
or "moral" persons have rightly been called "artificial."
The fiction of a "juristic person" means in its most general sense that the general law does not wish in all cases to
determine all conditions for individual rights and duties, but
that it sometimes determines only the conditions for the
creation of special rules, namely of by-laws or regulations,
and then these by-laws alone determine finally the condi-
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tions of individual rights and duties. This is a kind of delegated legislation, for the by-laws are still objective laws
which, however, are essentially distinct from the general law
by the fact that they are created by other than the general
legislative organs; thus is constituted the autonomy or the
self-government of corporations, institutions and foundations.
We do not propose to abolish the accustomed term "juristic person"; we only want to make clear and keep in mind
that this notion is merely a means devised to abbreviate the
extensive complexities of some juridical relations; but we
ought never to allow a mere figure to make obscure to us
the real character of those relations.
If one does not keep in mind this merely auxiliary function
of the term "juristic person," if one ascribes reality to it,
then a moral danger is likely to arise. For, once the "juristic
person" is considered as an entity by itself, one is inclined to
forget that human beings always stand behind this personification. In acting on behalf of, or against such an organization one sometimes believes himself to be dispensed from
the laws of morality under the assumption that human interests are not, or not directly, involved. And so, not seldom, a
lowering of the moral standard can be observed when acts
of states, corporations, trusts, municipalities, etc., are at
issue. The moral responsibility of the individual acting thus
in the interest of these bodies might be slighter insofar as
his personal interest is not involved. But nevertheless the
general condition of the world suffers from this state of
things. And a similar mentality is often exhibited by individuals when they are acting against such "juristic persons":
to do harm to a corporation, a society or the state is not
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considered so bad as to damage individuals. As if those "juristic persons" were something else than a mere expression to
describe the mechanism of an association of human beings;
and as if there were not behind this artificial bar (which in
many cases certainly is a useful help for our thought) human
beings who are the final gainers or losers, for it is beyond
any doubt that "omne jus hominum causa"!
Leonidas Pitamic.
Washington, D. C.

